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COMMENTARY
Show me the note!
By Bradley T. Borden, David J. Reiss and W. KeAupuni Akina 
Brooklyn Law School
News outlets and foreclosure defense blogs 
have focused attention on the defense 
commonly referred to as “show me the note.” 
This defense seeks to forestall or prevent 
foreclosure by requiring the foreclosing party 
to produce the mortgage and the associated 
promissory note as proof of its right to initiate 
foreclosure.
The defense arose in two recent state 
supreme-court cases and is also being raised 
in lower courts throughout the country.  It 
is not only important to individuals facing 
foreclosure but also for the mortgage 
industry and investors in mortgage-backed 
securities.  In the aggregate, the body of law 
that develops as a result of the foreclosure 
epidemic will probably shape mortgage law 
for a long time to come.  Courts across the 
country seemingly interpret the validity of the 
“show me the note” defense incongruously. 
Indeed, states appear to be divided on 
its application.  However, an analysis of 
the situations in which this defense is 
raised provides a framework that can help 
consumers and the mortgage industry to 
better predict how individual states will rule 
on this issue and can help courts as they 
continue to grapple with this matter.
Much of the confusion and uproar 
surrounding the “show me the note” defense 
stems from the rulings that appear to vary in 
different states.  However, the responses are 
not as random as they would first appear. 
as the District of Columbia, fall within 
Category 2.  The 2012 Arizona Supreme Court 
case of Hogan	v.	Washington	Mutual	Bank is 
a clear example of a Category 2 jurisdiction.2 
Category 2 jurisdictions interpret state laws 
regarding foreclosures so as to reject the 
requirement of proof, thereby permitting 
foreclosures to proceed.  Because of its 
heavy reliance on statutory language, Hogan 
serves as a reminder that one rule does not 
fit all.  This is true for consumers seeking to 
forestall foreclosure and eviction in different 
jurisdictions, as well as for lenders, servicers 
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“Show me the note” cases may be divided 
into four categories: 
• Non-judicial foreclosure in which the 
court requires proof of the note.
• Non-judicial foreclosure in which the 
court does not require proof of the note.
• Judicial foreclosure in which the court 
does not require proof of the note.
• Judicial foreclosure in which the court 
requires proof of the note.  
The following table summarizes these 
categories.
and other secondary-market players who 
may assume that the economics of the deal 
trump the particular legal requirements of 
each jurisdiction.
Category 3 states include Connecticut, 
Florida, Maine, Missouri, New York and 
Oklahoma.  One recent example is Gee	v.	U.S.	
Bank.3  The foreclosing party need not be the 
actual mortgage note holder, but merely one 
who has been assigned an interest in the note 
by the note holder.  This is the most common 
category, since parties seeking to benefit 
from the power of the judiciary must meet a 
threshold burden of standing to commence 
a case.
Barely any jurisdictions fall within Category 4. 
In these states, the court may permit judicial 
foreclosure without production of the note.4 
However, these jurisdictions are vanishingly 
rare, and our research has not revealed any 
contemporary examples of a Category 4 
jurisdiction.5 
It is useful to highlight that non-judicial 
foreclosures involve a deed of trust instead 
of a mortgage, whereas judicial foreclosures 
‘SHOW ME THE NOTE’ 
JURISDICTIONAL CATEGORIES
Massachusetts is a Category 1 state, as 
revealed in the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court case of Eaton	 v.	 Federal	 National	
Mortgage	 Association.1  Category 1 places 
a higher burden on parties seeking non-
judicial foreclosure because it requires them 
to produce the note.
A number of states, including Arizona, 
California, Idaho and Minnesota, as well 
Type of 
Foreclosure
Must Own Note to 
Foreclose
Need not Prove Ownership  
of Note to Foreclose
Non-Judicial Category 1 Category 2
Judicial Category 3 Category 4
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generally involve mortgages.  However, 
in this article, the term “mortgage” will 
be used loosely to cover both mortgages 
and deeds of trust in judicial and non-
judicial foreclosure situations.6  Cases that 
address foreclosure issues related to note 
and mortgage ownership are legion and 
growing.7  However, a review of that body of 
law in this context would be unwieldy, so we 
selected for discussion cases that illustrated 
each category.  We sought to use cases 
from state supreme courts when they were 
available.  For Category 3, we instead used 
an intermediate court case that reflected a 
consensus of all intermediate court rulings in 
that particular state.
CATEGORIES
Category 1: Eaton v. Federal National 
Mortgage Association
Background
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
affirmed the legitimacy of the “show me the 
note” defense in Eaton	 v.	 Federal	 National	
Mortgage	 Association, albeit prospectively 
only.8  On Sept. 12, 2007, Henrietta Eaton 
refinanced the mortgage on her home and 
executed a promissory note payable to 
BankUnited as the lender.  She also executed 
a mortgage with herself as “borrower,” 
BankUnited as “lender” and Mortgage 
Electronic Registration Systems Inc. as 
“mortgagee.”  The mortgage contained a 
clause that permitted the mortgagee MERS 
to invoke a “statutory power of sale” in the 
case of a default by Eaton.
On April 22, 2009, MERS assigned its interest 
in the mortgage to Green Tree.  However, 
there was no evidence of a corresponding 
transfer of the mortgage note.  In 2009, 
Eaton defaulted on the mortgage, and Green 
Tree (as MERS’ assignee) invoked the “power 
of sale,” foreclosed and won the foreclosure 
auction as the highest bidder.  The identity of 
the mortgage note holder at the time of sale 
was unknown, and on Nov. 24, 2009, Green 
Tree assigned its interest in the mortgage to 
Fannie Mae.
Procedural history
On Jan. 25, 2010, Fannie Mae commenced 
an eviction action against Eaton in housing 
court.  Eaton counterclaimed and raised the 
“show me the note” defense.  She claimed 
that the foreclosure was invalid because 
Green Tree was not the mortgage note holder 
at the time of foreclosure.  The housing court 
granted Eaton’s request for injunction of the 
eviction process.
Eaton filed a complaint in the Massachusetts 
Superior Court for injunctive and declaratory 
relief.  She claimed that the foreclosure sale 
and foreclosure deed were null and void, 
sought a preliminary injunction to stay the 
housing court eviction action, and requested 
a permanent injunction preventing Fannie 
Mae from obtaining possession of her home. 
The Superior Court granted Eaton’s petition, 
and Fannie Mae appealed for relief from the 
injunction.
On appeal, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court decided whether, under 
that state’s statutory law, a “mortgagee” 
who holds the mortgage and is initiating 
the “power of sale” clause authorized MERS, 
its successors and assigns as “mortgagees.”10
Court’s analysis
In addressing Fannie Mae’s arguments, the 
Massachusetts court conducted its own 
statutory analysis.  The court found that Mass. 
Gen. Laws ch. 183 § 21 permits a mortgagee 
to foreclose under a “power of sale” clause 
without judicial authorization, specifically 
in the case of default on the underlying 
mortgage note.  Section 21 only requires 
that the mortgagee comply with all relevant 
terms and statutes listed in Mass. Gen. Laws 
ch. 244 §§  11-17C.  Failure to comply voids 
the foreclosure sale. One of those statutes is 
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 244 § 14, which requires 
that the mortgagee provide notice to the 
Much of the confusion and uproar surrounding the  
“show me the note” defense stems from the rulings  
that appear to vary in different states.  
a foreclosure action must also physically 
possess the mortgage note to foreclose.
Massachusetts common law  
and statutory law
The court first considered relevant common 
law.  Under the common law, real estate 
mortgages are composed of a transfer of legal 
title to the mortgaged property (mortgage) 
and the underlying debt (mortgage note). 
However, each may be held by a different 
owner.  A review of applicable case law 
revealed that a mortgagee possessing only 
the mortgage has no authority to foreclose 
if it does not possess the mortgage note as 
well.
However, the court turned to statutory laws 
governing mortgages and noted that in 
Massachusetts “[t]he law of mortgage … 
is a mixed system, derived partly from the 
common law … but principally from various 
statutes” and that statutes play an important 
role in mortgage foreclosures with regard to 
a “power of sale” agreement.9
Appellant’s contentions
The appellant, Fannie Mae, argued that 
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 244 § 14 is unambiguous 
and expressly authorizes a foreclosure by 
the mortgage holder without the mortgage 
note if there is a “power of sale” clause in 
the mortgage agreement.  Thus, Fannie Mae 
concluded that Green Tree, as the assignee of 
MERS, was authorized to foreclose because 
mortgagor prior to foreclosure pursuant to a 
“power of sale” clause.  However, the court 
found that this statute is ambiguous in its 
usage of the term “mortgagee.” 
The crux of the court’s analysis and Fannie 
Mae’s appeal turned on a determination of 
the term “mortgagee” — whether it refers 
to the mortgage note holder, the mortgage 
holder or both.  In interpreting the statute, 
the court considered the term in the context 
of other applicable foreclosure statutes and 
their usage of the term. The court concluded 
that “mortgagee” under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 
244 § 14 means a mortgagee who also holds 
the underlying mortgage note.11
The court decided, however, that, on the 
basis of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 244 §§ 11-17C, 
a party who does not hold the mortgage may 
foreclose if the mortgage holder authorizes 
that party to foreclose.  The court explained 
that there was no statutory basis to suggest 
a legislative intent to limit the rules 
regarding agency when applying non-judicial 
foreclosure statutes.
The Massachusetts high court determined 
that, as applied to the facts of the case, the 
lower court’s decision to grant a preliminary 
injunction on the foreclosure did not take into 
consideration issues of agency, specifically 
whether Green Tree/MERS had authority to 
act on behalf of the mortgagee, BankUnited, 
in initiating foreclosure proceedings against 
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Eaton.  Although Eaton alleged that Green 
Tree lacked the requisite authority to 
foreclose, the court noted that she did so on 
the basis of “information and belief,” which is 
an inadequate factual basis upon which the 
lower court could not have properly granted 
a preliminary injunction.  Accordingly, the 
Massachusetts court vacated the preliminary 
injunction and remanded the case; this 
gave Eaton a new opportunity to provide a 
stronger factual basis.
Conclusion
The Massachusetts court held that in order 
to initiate judicial foreclosure proceedings, a 
“mortgagee” must either hold the mortgage 
note or act on behalf of the note holder. 
This holding raised issues of retroactive 
application.  The court acknowledged that 
before its ruling, many practitioners, in good 
faith, had operated under the assumption 
that a “mortgagee” only needed to hold the 
mortgage and not the note.  Accordingly, 
out of “concern for litigants and others who 
have relied on existing precedents,” the 
court gave this new requirement prospective 
effect.12 As a result, the ruling only applied 
to mortgage foreclosure sales in which the 
mandatory notice of sale was given after the 
opinion’s date. Issues of agency and proving 
the authority to foreclose played into the 
court’s analysis.  The Massachusetts court 
thereby acknowledged the “show me the 
note” defense in a non-judicial foreclosure 
proceeding.
Effect of Eaton on the mortgage 
foreclosure market
Since Eaton was just decided in 2012, its 
effects have yet to manifest themselves in 
a palpable way.  However, the likely result 
is that foreclosing parties in Massachusetts 
will have a more difficult time executing 
non-judicial foreclosures.  Although the 
bank in Eaton “won” in the sense that the 
homeowner’s motion for an injunction 
staying the foreclosure was vacated, it came 
at the cost of stricter requirements going 
forward for all lenders.  After Eaton, parties 
seeking non-judicial foreclosure must now 
have possession of the note or authority from 
the note owner to foreclose; this makes a 
“show me the note” defense much stronger 
in Massachusetts.  As a result, persons in the 
mortgage lending industry must now take 
efforts to ensure that owners of the mortgage 
and the mortgage note are represented in 
the foreclosure action.
In addition, the prospective effect of the new 
ruling introduces new challenges for persons 
conducting title searches, at least in the near 
term.  If a foreclosure does occur, a searcher 
has to “determine if the foreclosure occurred 
after the effective date of this opinion, and if 
the foreclosing creditor was the record holder 
of the underlying note.”13
Category 2: Hogan v. Washington 
Mutual Bank 
Background 
In Hogan	 v.	 Washington	 Mutual	 Bank,	 the 
Arizona Supreme Court came to a conclusion 
that was the opposite of that of the Eaton 
court.  Hogan addressed the issue of 
“whether a trustee may foreclose on a deed 
of trust without the beneficiary first having 
to show ownership of the note that the deed 
secures.”14 The court held that Arizona does 
not require a beneficiary to prove its authority 
(that is, to show the note) before the trustee 
commences a non-judicial foreclosure.
Hogan’s suits, the court of appeals affirmed 
and the Arizona Supreme Court granted 
review.
Plaintiff’s contentions
Hogan’s claims are worth setting forth 
carefully because similar arguments are 
being made in many jurisdictions.  Hogan 
raises four arguments in his petition.
First, he argued that before a trustee may 
exercise the power of sale (a non-judicial 
sale), the beneficiary must show possession 
of, or document its right to enforce, the 
underlying note tied to that mortgage — 
“show me the note.”  
Second, Hogan argued that a deed of trust, 
similar to a mortgage, “may be enforced only 
by, or on behalf of, a person who is entitled 
to enforce the obligation the mortgage 
secures.”15 This is what is referred to as the 
“true beneficiary” argument. 
Third, Hogan argued that the trustee must 
demonstrate its authority to collect on 
Category 2 jurisdictions interpret state laws regarding 
foreclosures so as to reject the requirement of proof,  
thereby permitting foreclosures to proceed.  
The petitioner, John Hogan, owned two 
properties for which the respondents 
commenced a non-judicial foreclosure 
proceeding.  The respondents, Long Beach 
Mortgage Co.,  Washington Mutual Bank, 
JPMorgan Chase Bank and Deutsche Bank, 
were the various lenders, successors and 
assigns under the two corresponding deeds 
of trust for the properties.  WaMu and 
Deutsche Bank were the beneficiaries of the 
deeds of trust at the time of foreclosure. The 
trustee in this case, California Reconveyance 
Co., was also a named respondent.
Procedural history
The procedural history of Hogan is relatively 
straightforward.  Hogan became delinquent 
on two mortgage loans that he took out 
with Long Beach.  The trustee then initiated 
non-judicial foreclosures on both and named 
WaMu as the beneficiary for the first property 
and Deutsche Bank as the beneficiary for 
the second property.  Hogan filed a lawsuit 
seeking to enjoin both sales unless the 
beneficiaries could prove that they were 
entitled to collect on their respective notes. 
The trial court granted a motion to dismiss 
the underlying note pursuant to Arizona’s 
Uniform Commercial Code.  This is referred 
to as the “UCC” argument.  
Finally, Hogan argued that the note and trust 
deed may not be separated.  This is referred 
to as the “construed together” argument.
Court’s analysis
In affirming the lower courts, the Arizona 
Supreme Court addressed each of Hogan’s 
claims.  As with Eaton, the court’s analysis 
was heavily dependent on the idiosyncrasies 
of state law.  First, with regard to the “show 
me the note” argument, the Arizona Supreme 
Court stated that no such requirement 
exists under Arizona law.  The court stated 
that Arizona law instead imposes minimal 
requirements necessary for a trustee to 
proceed with a non-judicial sale.  Under Ariz. 
Rev. Stat. § 33-809(C), after a notice of sale 
is recorded, the trustee must send Hogan 
the notice of sale signed by the beneficiary 
or its agent.  That notice had to contain a 
statement that a breach or non-performance 
of the trust deed had occurred.  Finally, the 
statute requires that the nature of such a 
breach or non-performance be disclosed. 
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Because Hogan did not allege that such 
notice was not properly given, the court 
found that Hogan was not entitled to relief.16
Second, the court’s analysis of the “true 
beneficiary” argument is nuanced and ties 
back to the “show me the note” argument. 
The court stated that Hogan did not allege 
Conclusion
The court in Hogan held that Arizona law 
did not require that a beneficiary prove its 
authority, or show the note, before a trustee 
commences a non-judicial foreclosure.  The 
Hogan court concluded with a discussion 
mortgage and the accompanying note, 
and that the mortgage was in default.  U.S. 
Bank alleged that Gee originally granted the 
mortgage and note to Advent Mortgage LLC, 
which assigned it to Option One Mortgage 
Corp., whose successor in interest, American 
Home Mortgage Servicing Inc., then assigned 
that interest to U.S. Bank.  Gee answered 
pro	 se, generally denying all allegations. 
U.S. Bank then filed a motion for summary 
judgment of foreclosure.  In support, U.S. 
Bank’s servicing agent, American Home, filed 
an affidavit affirming U.S. Bank’s claims of 
entitlement to the mortgage and the note, 
but it did not file the original note, mortgage 
or assignment of mortgage.  The affidavit 
made no mention or support of U.S. Bank’s 
claims for re-establishment and reformation. 
The court granted the motion for summary 
judgment, reestablished the lost mortgage, 
reformed the deed and granted foreclosure. 
Gee appealed. 
Florida law
Florida case law requires “the party seeking 
foreclosure to present evidence that it owns 
and holds the note and mortgage in question 
in order to proceed with a foreclosure 
action.”21 A plaintiff must either provide 
the original promissory note, or, under Fla. 
Stat. §  673.3091, seek to re-establish the 
lost note.22  Alternatively, if the plaintiff is 
not named as the payee in the mortgage 
note, then the note must be endorsed to the 
plaintiff, it must be a blank endorsement 
or the plaintiff must prove the note was 
assigned to him or her.  Accordingly, in order 
to bring the foreclosure action, U.S. Bank 
was required to prove that its predecessor 
in interest had the authority to assign the 
mortgage and underlying note to the bank.
Appellant’s contentions and court’s 
analysis
On appeal, Gee argued that U.S. Bank lacked 
standing to foreclose.  The appeals court 
agreed, since the original mortgage and 
accompanying note were never submitted. 
U.S. Bank instead submitted a copy of the 
mortgage and accompanying note and two 
assignments.  One assignment showed a 
transfer from Advent Mortgage to Option 
One.  The other assignment showed a transfer 
from American Home, as Option One’s 
successor in interest, to U.S. Bank.  However, 
the appeals court found it important that 
no proof was offered to show how American 
Home became the successor in interest.
It is useful to highlight that non-judicial foreclosures involve 
a deed of trust instead of a mortgage, whereas judicial 
foreclosures generally involve mortgages.  
that WaMu and Deutsche Bank were not 
entitled to enforce the underlying notes. 
Rather, Hogan merely argued that the 
trustees had the burden of demonstrating 
their rights before a non-judicial foreclosure 
may proceed — essentially raising the “show 
me the note” argument again.  Similarly, the 
court noted that Hogan neither affirmatively 
alleged that WaMu and Deutsche Bank 
were not holders of the notes, nor that they 
otherwise lacked the authority to enforce the 
notes.  Nor did Hogan dispute that he was in 
default under the deeds of trust.  The court 
also observed that Hogan did not dispute 
that he was properly noticed under Arizona 
non-judicial foreclosure statutes.  Thus, the 
court concluded that Arizona law follows the 
“true beneficiary” rule and that Hogan had 
not alleged any facts supporting a cause of 
action under that rule.
Third, the court quickly disposed of Hogan’s 
argument that under Arizona’s UCC, the 
trustees are required to demonstrate their 
authority to collect on a note.17  The court 
noted that the trustees were not seeking 
to enforce the underlying notes, but rather 
sought to enforce the terms of the trust 
deeds.  The UCC does not govern liens on 
real property, and the trust deed does not 
require compliance with the UCC.  Thus, the 
court ruled that the UCC was inapplicable to 
the trustees’ non-judicial foreclosure.
Finally, the court dismissed Hogan’s 
argument that the underlying note and 
the trust deed must be construed together. 
Although the underlying note and the 
trust deed generally go together, that was 
irrelevant to the court’s analysis.  Rather, the 
court’s concern was whether the trustees had 
the statutory right to foreclose on the deeds 
of trust, not the underlying note.
of some policy implications.  It stated that 
“non-judicial foreclosures sales are meant 
to operate quickly and efficiently, outside the 
judicial process.”18 The court further stated 
that otherwise the foreclosure process might 
become “time consuming and expensive.”19
It is not clear, however, that the structure 
of Arizona law is sufficiently protective of 
homeowners in the context of non-judicial 
foreclosures.  Post-Hogan, one can imagine 
scenarios in which homeowners are placed in 
situations in which they have been wronged 
but no remedy is available.  For instance, 
some homeowners who are improperly 
foreclosed upon may face a second lawsuit 
from the true owner of the note.  Although 
Arizona has an anti-deficiency statute, it does 
not cover all residential properties, and the 
homeowner would face legal fees to defend 
against a second lawsuit in any event.
Category 3: Gee v. U.S. Bank
Background
In Gee	 v.	 U.S.	 Bank, the Florida 5th District 
Court of Appeal reaffirmed long-standing 
Florida precedent that a party seeking a 
judicial foreclosure must “present evidence 
that it owns and holds the note and 
mortgage in question in order to proceed 
with a foreclosure action.”20  
In this case, U.S. Bank alleged that Ginnifer 
Gee’s mortgage and the accompanying note 
changed hands several times through a series 
of assignments, which ultimately ended with 
U.S. Bank in possession.  U.S. Bank then filed 
a complaint against Gee to re-establish a lost 
note and mortgage, reform the mortgage 
and deed’s legal description and foreclose on 
the new note and mortgage.
Procedural history
U.S. Bank brought its complaint in state 
circuit court and asserted that it was the 
successor in interest to the owner of Gee’s 
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Gee’s answer, which generally denied U.S. 
Bank’s allegations, placed ownership of the 
mortgage and underlying note at issue, with 
the burden of proof on U.S. Bank.  Because 
no proof was offered to show how American 
Home became Option One’s successor in 
interest, there was a missing link in the chain 
of ownership.  On the basis of this deficiency, 
the appeals court found that U.S. Bank 
lacked standing to foreclose.
Conclusion
The court in Gee reversed the lower court 
and held that U.S. Bank lacked standing 
because it did not prove it held the mortgage 
and underlying note in question.  Thus, in 
Florida judicial foreclosures such as Gee, 
the party seeking foreclosure must establish 
standing by providing proof that it either 
held the original mortgage and underlying 
note or that it is the holder’s authorized 
representative.23
Category 4: No contemporary cases 
found
Our research did not reveal any contemporary 
examples of a jurisdiction that falls into 
Category 4.  This makes sense, since the 
burden of proof is on the party seeking 
foreclosure to prove that it is legally entitled 
to foreclose.  For a court to waive proof 
of the mortgage and the note would call 
into question why there would be a court 
proceeding at all. 
ANALYZING THE FOUR CATEGORIES
The preceding cases highlight two 
distinguishing factors that can determine the 
outcome of a challenge to a foreclosure sale. 
The first factor is whether the foreclosure sale 
is executed through a judicial or non-judicial 
proceeding.  The second factor focuses on 
whether the party seeking foreclosure is 
the mortgage note holder or an authorized 
representative of the holder. 
First, the most notable factor is whether the 
foreclosure was brought through a judicial 
or non-judicial proceeding.  Both Eaton and 
Hogan dealt with non-judicial foreclosure 
sales.  In each case, the court looked to each 
respective state’s laws governing non-judicial 
foreclosure in determining whether a “show 
me the note” argument applied.  Some 
states permit non-judicial foreclosures, and 
some permit both judicial and non-judicial 
foreclosure.24 Generally, the mortgage 
industry prefers non-judicial foreclosure 
because of its speed and relatively low cost. 
Second, the outcome of a challenge to a 
mortgage foreclosure depends on whether 
the foreclosing party must hold title (or 
be an authorized representative) to the 
mortgage, the underlying note or both.  In 
cases in Category 2 states, such as Hogan, 
the foreclosing party need only hold the 
mortgage in order to initiate a foreclosure 
sale.  However, cases in Category 1 and 3 
states, such as Eaton and Gee, require the 
mortgage and the note.
In contrast, Category 3 cases, such as Gee, 
in which the court requires proof in a judicial 
proceeding that the foreclosing party holds 
both the mortgage and the underlying note 
or is authorized by the note holder, have the 
toughest requirements of all four categories. 
It is important to remember that with regard 
to non-judicial foreclosures, the idiosyncrasies 
of state statutes determine whether the 
“show me the note” defense can succeed. 
In judicial foreclosures, common law plays 
a key role in a court’s determinations.  Put 
simply, the key to making sense of seemingly 
conflicting applications of the “show me 
the note” defense is to look to each state’s 
statutes regarding foreclosure sales.
WHY THE HYPE?
Recent cases regarding the “show me the 
note” defense rely largely on well-established 
precedent and applicable statutes.  This 
suggests that the defense is not a currently 
evolving area of the law.  However, the 
defense still receives much attention and is 
still unsuccessfully raised in many cases.25 
This is not surprising, since lenders have 
used deceptive practices to recover debts 
and make loans, and homeowners are 
already leery of financial institutions that 
have played fast and loose with the legal 
process.26  Accordingly, homeowners have 
come to believe that it is to their advantage 
to demand that a foreclosing party produce 
the note.  Homeowners also reasonably 
believe that the production of the note helps 
to ensure that they are only liable once for 
the same underlying debt.
Still, many homeowners assert the “show 
me the note” defense with little chance of 
success.  A federal district judge in Minnesota 
opined as to the causes of that trend and 
indicated that many of these lawsuits 
are brought by plaintiffs who represent 
themselves. Some of these plaintiffs seem 
to be desperate homeowners who have 
searched the Internet for a way to save their 
homes from foreclosure, run across websites 
touting unconventional legal theories and 
been persuaded of the merit of the “show me 
the note” theory. Other plaintiffs seem to be 
homeowners who fully understand that this 
theory is frivolous but are simply looking for 
a way to tie up their mortgagees in court, 
postpone the inevitable foreclosures and live 
rent-free in their homes for months or even 
years.27 
Another reason homeowners may seek to 
forestall foreclosure with the “show me the 
note” defense is to buy just enough time to 
work out an alternative to foreclosure.28  That 
being said, “show me the note” is successful 
in at least one non-judicial foreclosure 
jurisdiction — Massachusetts.  Thus,  it is a 
viable claim or defense for homeowners in 
that state.
CONCLUSION
For homeowners, defending against a 
foreclosure action, whether judicial or non-
judicial, is stressful.  In an era in which Google 
has made self-help the norm that sometimes 
replaces professional help, homeowners are 
susceptible to misinformation regarding the 
“show me the note” defense.  However, the 
state of the law is not as confusing as it may 
appear, and the various scenarios stemming 
from this type of defense can be divided into 
the four simple categories outlined above.   WJ
NOTES
1 Eaton v. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, 969 N.E.2d 
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ROMANIAN MAN ADMITS TO 
HACKING CREDIT CARD DATA 
Adrian-Tiberiu Oprea, 29, has pleaded guilty 
in New Hampshire federal court to hacking 
into the computers of several hundred U.S. 
merchants and stealing customer credit 
card data, the Department of Justice said in 
a statement May 7.  Prosecutors said Oprea 
and his Romania-based co-conspirators 
gained access to the computers, installed 
specialized hacking software and obtained 
data on more than 100,000 cardholders. 
The thefts occurred between 2009 and 2011 
and the victimized merchants included 150 
Subway restaurants, including one in New 
Hampshire.
United States v. Oprea et al., No. 11-CR-64, 
plea entered (D.N.H. May 7, 2013).
FDIC TAKES ACTION AFTER 
ARIZONA BANK FAILS 
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. said in 
a May 14 statement that it has moved the 
assets and deposits of the failed Scottsdale, 
Ariz.-based Central Arizona Bank to North 
Dakota-based Western State Bank.  The 
FDIC arranged the transfer in its capacity 
as Central’s receiver after Arizona state 
regulators acted on liquidity concerns and 
closed the bank.  Central had $31.6 million 
in assets and $30.8 million in deposits as of 
March 31, according to the FDIC.   The bank 
is the 13th institution to fail this year and the 
second in Arizona.
FEDS TOUT SUCCESS OF MORTGAGE 
RELIEF PROGRAM
More than 1.1 million homeowners have 
obtained permanent mortgage modifications 
through the government’s Home Affordable 
Modification Program as of March, the 
Treasury Department and the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development said 
in a joint statement May 10.  The agencies 
said the borrowers saved an average of 
$546 on their monthly payments.  In addition, 
87 percent of mortgage borrowers who began 
participating in the HAMP over the last two-
and-a-half years have received permanent 
modifications.  The data is based on the 
Obama administration’s Housing Scorecard 
for April.  The monthly scorecard examines 
the housing industry and the effect of the 
administration’s programs aimed at helping 
at-risk homeowners avoid foreclosure.  The 
current scorecard is available at  http://
portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/
huddoc?id=HUDAprilNat2013_SC.pdf.
